ABSTRACT. A matching game is a cooperative game defined by a graph G = .V; E/. The player set is V and the value of a coalition S ⊆ V is defined as the size of a maximum matching in the subgraph induced by S. We show that the nucleolus of such games can be computed efficiently. The result is based on an alternative characterization of the least core which may be of independent interest. The general case of weighted matching games remains unsolved.
INTRODUCTION
A cooperative game is defined by a set N of players and a value function v : 2 N → R, associating a value v.S/ to every subset (coalition) S ⊆ N. We assume that v.∅/ = 0. The value v.S/ of a coalition S ⊆ N is interpreted as the total gain the members of S can achieve by cooperating.
The central problem in cooperative game theory is how to allocate the total gain v * = v.N / among the individual players i ∈ N in a "fair" way. There are various notions of fairness and corresponding allocation rules (solution concepts).
Clearly, a useful solution concept should not only be "fair" in an adequate sense but also efficiently computable. The computational complexity of -by now classicalsolution concepts has therefore been studied with growing interest during the last years (see, e.g., Deng and Papadimitriou [1994] , Granot and Granot [1992] , Granot et al. [1996] , Faigle et al. [1997] for S ⊆ N. Any x ∈ R N with x.N / = v * is an allocation. So a core allocation x ∈ R V guarantees each coalition S ⊆ N to be satisfied in the sense that it gets at least what it could gain on its own. We let P 1 .ž/ denote the set of all x ∈ R V such that .x; ž/ satisfies the constraints of (P 1 ). So core(N; v)= P 1 .0/. The least core is defined as leastcore.N; v/ := P 1 .ž 1 /:
The excess of a coalition ∅ = S N with respect to an allocation x ∈ R V is defined as
e.S; x/ := x.S/ − v.S/:
So least core allocations are those that maximize the minimal excess. If the least core is not yet a single point, one might try to find "the best" allocation in the least core by further pursuing the idea of maximizing minimum excess: Given an allocation x ∈ R V define the excess vector Â.x/ to be the 2 N − 2 dimensional vector whose components are the excesses e.S; x/; ∅ = S N, ordered nondecreasingly. The nucleolus (Schmeidler [1969] ) is then the (unique!) allocation x ∈ R V that lexicographically maximizes Â.x/.
Although computational aspects shall be discussed later, it is immediately clear that computing the nucleolus by explicit lexicographic optimization of the excess vector is infeasible: In general there are exponentially (in |N|) many different excess values, whereas an efficient procedure should be polynomial in |N|. The standard procedure for computing the nucleolus proceeds by solving up to |N| linear programs. To present it we introduce the following notation: For a polyhedron P ⊆ R N let Fix P := {S ⊆ N | x.S/ = y.S/ for all x; y ∈ P} denote the set of coalitions fixed by P.
Now, assume we have determined the least core P 1 .ž 1 /. We then proceed to maximize the minimal excess on those coalitions which are not already fixed, i.e., we solve
and let ž 2 > ž 1 be the corresponding optimum value. Extending our previous notation in the obvious way, we let P 2 .ž/ denote the set of all x ∈ R N satisfying the constraints of (P 2 ) for ž ∈ R. Now proceed to
defines a unique solution x * ∈ R V , the nucleolus of the game.
Since the feasible regions of the above sequence of LP's decrease in dimension, we conclude that r ≤ |N|. So we compute at most |N| different excess values explicitly. Note, however, that in each step we have to identify the set Fix P i .ž i /. Furthermore, the number of constraints in each ( P i ) remains exponential in |N|.
The above "Linear Programming approach" to the nucleolus is also interesting from a structural point of view, as it implies a nice bound on the size < x * > of the nucleolus (number of bits necessary to represent x * ). Let < v > denote the maximum size of the v-values, i.e., < v >:= max{< v.S/ > | S ⊆ N}. 
equals .ž 1 ; : : : ; ž r ; x * /, where x * is the nucleolus and ž 1 ; : : : ; ž r are the optimum values of . P 1 /; : : : ; .P r /. Hence .ž 1 ; : : : ; ž r ; x * / is a vertex of the feasibility region of the above program. As such its size is polynomial in the dimension r + |N| = O.|N|/ and the maximum size of a constraint (i.e., the facet complexity, cf.
Grötschel, Lovász and Schrijver [1988] ). The latter is bounded by |N|+ < v >. ♦ As to complexity issues in cooperative game theory, various results have been obtained for particular classes of games and solution concepts. For example, socalled minimum spanning tree games have been studied with respect to core, least core and nucleolus, cf. The present paper deals with so-called matching games (cf. section 2) which have been studied already earlier. Solymosi and Raghavan [1994] present an efficient algorithm for computing the nucleolus in the bipartite case (so-called assignment games). Deng, Ibaraki and Nagamochi [1999] characterize when the core is empty (cf. also section 2). Faigle et al. [1998a] introduce the nucleon as an alternative to the nucleolus, present an efficient algorithm for computing the nucleon and point out that the problem of computing the nucleolus remains unsolved. Faigle, Kern and Kuipers [1998c] prove a general result on the complexity of the so-called kernel (a subset of the least core) of a game. As a consequence of this, computing an element in the least core is easy for matching games. The complexity of the nucleolus remains unsolved yet. In the current paper we solve the "unweighted case" by presenting an efficient algorithm for computing the nucleolus of cardinality matching games. Our result is based on a polynomial description of the least core of such games, which might be of independent interest.
MATCHING GAMES
Let G = .V; E/ be a graph and w : E → R + an edge weighting. We use the following standard notation: For S ⊆ V we let E.S/ ⊆ E denote the set of edges joining vertices of S. For F ⊆ E we let V .F/ denote the set of vertices covered by F. G and w define a cooperative game with player set V. The value of a coalition S ⊆ V is given by
the maximum weight matching in the subgraph induced by S.
In the following we restrict ourselves to cardinality matching games. These arise when w ≡ 1, i.e., the value function is given by v.S/ := max{ |M| | M ⊆ E.S/ is a matching }:
Example
(i) Let G = K 2 be the complete graph on two nodes. Then (P 1 ) has a unique optimal solution, given by the nucleolus x * = . In the following we assume that G = K 2 .
(ii) Let G = .V; E/ be the graph as shown in Figure 2 .1. V is split into {a} ∪ D 1 ∪ D 2 . Then (P 1 ) has a unique optimal solution: the nucleolus x * given by 
Then ž 1 = −1 and P 1 .−1/ contains all allocations x ∈ R 11 for which
The nucleolus x * is given by 
where M C is a perfect matching in C , the union of all even components. M D induces a near-perfect matching in all odd components D ∈ D and M A;D is a matching which matches A (completely) into D, the union of odd components.
Equivalently, A is a Tutte-set if and only if the size v * of a maximum matching in G equals
Tutte sets can be found efficiently. More precisely, the following is true (see, e.g., Lovász and Plummer [1986] )
is some maximum matching which does not completely cover D.
In the following we assume that A ⊆ V is a (fixed) Tutte set satisfying the conditions (i) and (ii) in Theorem 2.1. We let M * denote the set of maximum matchings
We will sometimes identify subsets of V with the corresponding induced subgraphs. For example, if i ∈ V is a vertex we do not hesitate to write i ∈ D to indicate that i is a vertex of the component D ∈ D. If x ∈ R V is an allocation, we consequently write
Finally, we also extend our general shorthand notation in the following way, if no misunderstanding is possible: If e = .i; j/ ∈ E, we write x.e/ = x.{i; j}/.
After these preliminaries let us study core(G) and leastcore(G), the core and least core of the matching game defined by G. We start with the following simple observation (cf. also Deng, Ibaraki and Nagamochi Proof: "⇐": : THE LEAST CORE AND THE NUCLEOLUS   7 is easily seen to be in the core.
we conclude that G\i and G\ j have matchings of size v * . So if x ∈ R V were in the core, then
Furthermore, x.e/ = x.{i; j}/ ≥ 1. Together, these imply x.V / > v * , a contradiction. Hence the core must be empty. ♦
Since the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition can be computed efficiently, we can easily check whether the core is empty or not. In the latter case, the least core and the nucleolus are straightforward to compute. This is essentially due to the fact that all ž i are non-negative:
In case of non-empty core (ž 1 ≥ 0) the least core equals the set of allocations x ∈ R V solving
Proof: The proof is straightforward, using the fact that the above constraints (for Continuing in a similar way, also the nucleolus can be computed easily. We first identify
x.e/ = 1 + ž
with optimum value ž + 2 = ž 2 etc. Remark 2.2. Note that also for general weighted matching games with non-empty core, a similar characterization of the (least) core and nucleolus exists.
The above approach fails in case ž 1 < 0. In this case, at least intuitively, large coalitions S ⊆ V get fixed in the first place rather than small ones (single nodes and edges) as above. The case ž 1 < 0 (empty core) is treated in section 3.
WHEN THE CORE IS EMPTY
In the following we assume that the core is empty. Equivalently, ž 1 < 0 and |D| > 1 for some odd component D ∈ D. We first state the following simple fact (which in the non-empty core case follows trivially from Theorem 2.3):
Assume to the contrary that (x; ž 1 ) is an optimal solution of
Proof: Assume to the contrary that i = ∈ S.
Hence the claim is true. But then we may slightly increase x on {i} and decrease x on V\i uniformly by the same total amount, thereby obtaining a better solution. This proves the lemma. ♦ Due to Lemma 3.1 the problem (P 1 ) defining the least core can equivalently be stated as follows. Let M denote the set of matchings M ⊆ E. Then (recall our notation x.M/ = x.V .M// from section 2):
Proposition 3.1. Checking whether a given x ∈ R V is an element of P 1 .ž/ can be done in polynomial time.
Proof: It suffices to show that for given x ∈ R V and ž ∈ R we can sufficiently check whether : THE LEAST CORE AND THE NUCLEOLUS   9 holds. This can be done by solving a minimum weight matching problem on G = .V; E/ with respect to the edge weights
see, e.g., Lovász and Plummer [1986] . ♦ As a consequence of Proposition 3.1 we can solve ( P 1 ) efficiently (cf. Faigle, Kern and Kuipers [1998c] for more detail.) Here we aim for more, namely a concise description of P 1 .ž 1 /.
As a first step we introduce a relaxation (P 1 ) of (P 1 ) below which is easier to analyze and, as we shall see, defines the same optimum value. To motivate this approach, note that, as mentioned earlier, we expect rather large matchings to become tight when solving (P 1 ). Let M * denote the set of maximum matchings in G and let M D denote the set of matchings M ⊆ E. D / which are completely contained in the union of the odd components.
We shall study the following relaxation of (P 1 ):
with optimum valuež 1 . (As in the proof of Theorem 2.2, it is easy to see that ž 1 < 0, cf. also below.)
To investigate the structure of optimal solutions of (P 1 ), let us introduce some notation. As before,P 1 .ž/ denotes the set of x ∈ R V such that (x; ž) is feasible for 
Lemma 3.4. Let x ∈P
Proof: Let x ∈P 1 .ž 1 /. We first prove (ii) and (iii) forx and then show that x =x.
(ii)x ≤ 
Proof:
The lemma is trivial in case A ∪ C = ∅. So we suppose A C = ∅ and we first claim that any
Now let us show that some M ∈ M * isx-tight. Suppose to the contrary that x.M/ > |M| +ž 1 for all M ∈ M * . We could then decrease (somehow)x on A ∪ C and increasex uniformly on D by the same total (sufficiently small) amount. The resultingx were still inP 1 .ž 1 / and would contradict Lemma 3.4 (iii).
By Lemma 3.3, this implies that each D ∈ D max is uncovered by somex-tight M ∈ M * . We are left to prove a corresponding result for D ∈ D with |D| > 1. Hence assume D ∈ D\D max and |D| > 1. Thenx < ♦ We are now prepared to present our main result, a simple alternative description of the least core. Consider the LP
Note that x ≡x is just a shorthand for a number of linear equalities of the type x i = x j . Further note that for x ≡x the value x.M/ is independent of the particular
Hence the exponentially many constraints for M ∈ M * D reduce to one single inequality.
Again, we letP 1 .ž/ := {x | .x; ž/is feasible for.P 1 /} and denote the optimum value of (P 1 ) byž 1 . 
We show thatx ∈P 1 .ž 1 / (proving thatž 1 ≥ž 1 ). The only non-trivial constraints to check arex.V / = v * andx.e/ ≥ 1 for e ∈ E\E. D/. All other constraints directly follow from Lemma 3.4.
Let M ∈ M * bex-tight and decompose it as Since M isx-tight, a ∈ A j is matched into D j by some edge f ∈ M (cf. Proposition 3.2). But then M = M\ f + e hasx.M / <x.M/, a contradiction.
•ž 1 ≤ ž 1 : We show that in generalP 1 .ž/ ⊆ P 1 .ž/. Suppose x ∈P 1 .ž/. Then • Finally, let us verify that P 1 .ž 1 / =P 1 .ž 1 /. We have just proved that "⊇" holds. Conversely let x ∈ P 1 .ž 1 /. 
THE NUCLEOLUS
Recall from section 1 that the nucleolus is computed by solving the following sequence of LP's:
with optimum value ž 2 , etc. until the nucleolus is finally determined as the unique solution x * , ž * = ž r of
By Theorem 3.1, (P 1 ) is equivalent to .P 1 / in the sense that they define the same set of optimal solutions. As we shall see, similar equivalent formulations can be found for (P k ), k ≥ 2. Define recursively
As before, letž k denote the optimum value of (P k ) and defineP k .ž/ in the obvious way. In the same way we can show that x i ≥ ž − ž 1 for a vertex i = ∈ FixP.ž k−1 /.
Next consider e ∈ E. D /, say e ∈ E.D/ for D ∈ D. We show that x.e/ ≤ 1 − ž + ž 1 unless e is already fixed byP k−1 .ž k−1 / = P k−1 .ž k−1 /. Since x ≡ x D on D ∈ D, we conclude that x.e/ is independent of the particular choice of e ∈ E.D/.
Choose any M ∈ M * D and assume without loss of generality that e ∈ M ∩ E.D/ is not fixed by P k−1 .ž k−1 /. Since x.M/ is fixed (to |M| + ž 1 ), we conclude that M\e = ∈ Fix P k−1 .ž k−1 /. Hence x ∈ P k .ž/ implies x.M\e/ ≥ |M\e| + ž. Together with x.M/ = |M| + ž 1 we get x.e/ ≤ 1 + ž 1 − ž.
(ii)P k .ž/ ⊆ P k .ž/ (implying that ž k ≥ž k ): 
